Elgin, C. (2010). Persistent disagreements. In R. Feldman – T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagrement (p. 53-68). New York: Oxford University Press. Whether it`s the right amount of vitamin D or the root causes of poverty, confused scientific differences surround us. There`s an old joke: ask 10 doctors a question, you get 11 answers.

Beyond confusion, eternal disagreement can undermine faith in science. You almost hear a politician say, “If scientists can`t choose, why should I believe everything they say?” These are just some of the questions for further research raised by the documents collected in this volume. There will undoubtedly be great differences of opinion on how to answer these kinds of questions – but, as we now know, it is the same course. The other four works in this volume on scientific disagreement form a natural grouping, as they all deal with models based on agents of scientific and secular communities. Dunja`eljas “Some lessons from simulations of scientific divergences” states that we must be careful about how we interpret the results of models based on existing agents, and that these models do not always support the kind of conclusions that their proponents have made. In particular, Eelja considers agent-based models that appear to support the value of a “firm” approach to the differences of opinion of their peers, i.e. maintaining one`s own faith as a response to the well-known divergence with an epistemic peer. Some modellers, for example. B Douven (2010) and Langhe (2013), may increase the likelihood of approaching a true theory. Seelja stresses, however, that these results are not strictly used to support the maintenance of its own pre-production; On the contrary, if they are, they support the pursuit of a theory with which their own colleagues disagree if such persecution is consistent with belief in theory. In practical terms, Seidel`s analysis of Mr. Kuhn`s ideas focuses on whether, or to what extent, philosophical reports of scientific rationality should be intended to explain the phenomenon of scientific disagreement.

To date, the literature has not explicitly addressed scientific differences in scientific conclusions and theoretical choices, indicating that this could provide a fruitful perspective on such issues. Similarly, Shaw`s assertion that differences in science should be welcomed following a vision of Feyerabend`s science raises important questions about how to reconcile the importance of open and honest exchange between scientists with the risk of established differences that undermine public confidence in science, for example. B the reality of anthropogenic climate change. Massimi`s paper suggests that, in some cases, this tension can be mitigated by analyzing divergences as a difference in “perspective” and not as a mere factual quarrel over the scientific theory it must support.